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The Supreme Court decision in the Hobby Lobby 
case is in many ways a sequel to the Court’s 
2012 decision on the constitutionality of the Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA).1,2 Like the 2012 case, 
the decision was decided by a 5-to-4 vote, but in 
the initial ACA decision, Chief Justice John Rob-
erts acted to “save” the ACA.3 Not this time. 
Then the watchword was “broccoli,” as in forc-
ing people to eat it; this time it is abortion, as in 
forcing employers to pay for it. To simplify, the 
choice facing the Court in the Hobby Lobby case 
was whether to favor the exercise of religion by 
for-profit corporations (whose owners believe 
contraceptives that may prevent fertilized eggs 
from implanting violate their religious beliefs) 
over the federal government’s attempt to create 
a uniform set of health care insurance benefits. 
As recommended by the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM),4 such benefits include all contraceptives 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) as preventive health care for women.
Two editorials neatly summarize the conflict-
ing politics of the decision. According to the New 
York Times, the “deeply dismaying decision . . . 
swept aside accepted principles of corporate law 
and religious liberty to grant owners of closely 
held, for-profit companies an unprecedented 
right to impose their religious views on employ-
ees . . . [by denying] thousands of women 
contraceptive coverage vital to their well-being 
and reproductive freedom.”5 The Wall Street Jour-
nal, on the other hand, saw the decision as “nar-
row [and] an important vindication of religious 
liberty in this (still blessedly) pluralistic consti-
tutional republic,” noting that “women who work 
for the small number of religiously oriented 
businesses will still be able to buy birth control 
for as little as $9 a month.”6
The majority decision, written by Justice 
Samuel Alito, is a setback for both the ACA’s 
foundational goal of access to universal health 
care and for women’s health care specifically. It 
is also especially worrisome that abortion is 
again at the center of the continuing debate over 
the implementation of the ACA and that the 
challenge of abortion has been expanded to in-
clude birth control.7 This has happened even 
though, in the opinion of medical experts, the 
four methods of contraception under scrutiny 
do not induce abortion; rather, they prevent abor-
tion by preventing pregnancy.4,8 This controversy 
could occur only because in assessing the com-
peting claims about abortion and birth control, 
the Court’s majority focused on the religious 
claims of the corporations without discussing 
scientific or medical opinions. As Judge Mary 
Beck Briscoe observed in her dissent in the 10th 
Circuit, the belief of Hobby Lobby’s owners “is 
not one of religious belief but rather of purport-
ed scientific fact.”9,10
The AC A and the Religious 
Freedom Restor ation Ac t
The ACA does not itself require insurance plans 
to cover contraception but does require coverage 
of four categories of preventive care without cost 
sharing by patients. The fourth category covers 
women’s health and requires new insurance plans 
to cover “such additional preventive care and 
screenings . . . as provided for in comprehen-
sive guidelines supported by the Health Resourc-
es and Services Administration (HRSA)” of the 
Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS).11 HRSA asked the IOM to help the agen-
cy develop this list,4 and the IOM applied neutral 
scientific and medical criteria to conclude that 
coverage should include the “full range” of FDA-
approved contraceptive methods. HRSA adopted 
this recommendation, and HHS promulgated 
the contraceptive-coverage regulations, which 
include 20 specific contraceptives, accordingly.12
The owners of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga 
Wood Specialties objected to the inclusion of four 
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of the FDA-approved contraceptives (two types 
of intrauterine devices [IUDs] and the emergen-
cy contraceptives Plan B and Ella) because they 
believed that these devices or drugs could induce 
abortion. The Conestoga board of directors be-
lieves that “human life begins at conception,” 
that it is a “sin against God” to be involved in 
the “termination of a human life,” and that the 
four FDA-approved contraceptives might operate 
as “abortifacients.”2 Hobby Lobby’s owners sim-
ilarly believe that life begins at conception and 
that it would be a violation of their religion “to 
facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices 
that operate after that point.”2
The case centered not on a constitutional 
analysis of the First Amendment but on interpret-
ing a federal statute, the 1993 Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA), which states that “gov-
ernment shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability [unless it] is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental in-
terest; and is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering that compelling governmental interest.”
For RFRA to be relevant, the term “person” 
must include for-profit corporations. Despite the 
statute’s silence on this point, and strong his-
torical and conceptual arguments for excluding 
corporations (which are artificial persons creat-
ed by law and are separate and distinct from 
their shareholders)13 from RFRA’s protection of 
religious freedom, the majority concluded that 
corporations are persons under RFRA. The ma-
jority understood that corporations are legal fic-
tions, artificial entities created entirely by law, 
but nonetheless observed that the corporation is 
created to protect the rights of real people, in-
cluding “shareholders, officers, and employees.” 
The fact that corporations themselves cannot 
exercise religion is, in the words of the majority, 
“quite beside the point. Corporations ‘separate 
and apart from’ the human beings who own, 
run, and are employed by them cannot do any-
thing at all.”2 This is true, but it does not ex-
plain why corporations have always been treated 
in law as entities separate from their human 
owners. Nonetheless, once the majority conclud-
ed that a nonprofit corporation can exercise reli-
gion, the justices could find no reason, and no 
congressional intent, to exclude for-profit cor-
porations from RFRA’s protections.
The majority also found that the contracep-
tive-coverage regulations “substantially burden” 
the corporations’ exercise of religion. This is be-
cause in order to follow their religion, the own-
ers believed they could not offer insurance that 
covered any contraceptive that “may result in 
the destruction of an embryo.”2 And if they ex-
cluded these contraceptives, the “economic con-
sequences will be severe” under the ACA.2 They 
could, for example, be taxed $100 a day for each 
affected individual. The corporations could also 
drop insurance coverage entirely and pay less un-
der the ACA than the cost of coverage. The ma-
jority rejected this option because the corporations 
believed that providing health insurance was 
also a religious obligation.
Religion and Birth Control
The majority’s finding left only two legal issues 
to be decided. Does the state have a compelling 
interest in ensuring that all women have access 
to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost 
sharing? And if so, is the regulation the “least-
restrictive means” to ensure this? The majority 
assumed, without deciding, that the government’s 
interest was compelling and quickly moved to 
the then decisive question of whether the contra-
ceptive mandate was the least restrictive means. 
The majority’s answer was no.
The majority of the Court suggested two less 
restrictive means. The first was for the federal 
government to pay the cost of covering the four 
contraceptives at issue. This suggestion does not 
seem to be politically realistic. The second less 
restrictive alternative was more serious and more 
interesting. HHS regulations had already estab-
lished an accommodation for nonprofit religious 
corporations — namely, they can self-certify 
that they have a religious objection to particular 
contraceptives, and an alternative plan will be 
put in place to ensure coverage to their employ-
ees without payment or other action by the ob-
jecting corporation. The majority first suggested 
that this is a reasonable accommodation but 
then almost immediately said it might not be 
legal, thereby saving for a future date the issue 
raised by the Little Sisters of the Poor who ob-
jected even to filing a certificate.14
Nonetheless, in light of the importance of 
the HHS accommodation to the Court’s opin-
ion, the three women justices were surprised 
when, only 3 days after issuing the Hobby Lob-
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by decision, a majority of the Court issued an 
order provisionally exempting Wheaton College 
from the self-certifying accommodation. To do 
this, the majority had to take seriously Whea-
ton’s argument that the HHS accommodation 
itself violates an institution’s religious freedom 
on the basis of an even more attenuated theory 
of cause and effect than that at issue in the Hobby 
Lobby case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, 
joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena 
Kagan, and rightly juxtaposed the two seemingly 
incongruous rulings, writing that “[t]hose who 
are bound by our decisions usually believe they 
can take us at our word. Not so today. After ex-
pressly relying on the availability of the religious-
nonprofit accommodation” to hold in Hobby 
Lobby’s favor, “the Court now, as the dissent in 
Hobby Lobby feared it might . . . retreats from 
that position.” For the dissenting justices, such 
action “evinces disregard for even the newest of 
this Court’s precedents and undermines confi-
dence in this institution.”15
Near the end of their opinion in Hobby Lobby, 
the majority stated that HHS apparently believes 
that “no insurance coverage mandate would vio-
late RFRA . . . [even requiring, where legal] all 
employers to provide coverage for . . . third-
trimester abortions or assisted suicide.” Since 
religious people could not do this, “HHS would 
effectively exclude these people from full par-
ticipation in the economic life of the Nation,” by 
effectively precluding them from using the cor-
porate form to do business.2 The majority added 
that not all religious objections to specific man-
dates, such as immunizations, would necessarily 
succeed but did not explain why not or provide 
doctrinal principles that would ensure that im-
munizations remain mandatory. The majority 
noted that religious objections to taxes would not 
succeed because this would “lead to chaos”2,16 
but did not explain why this government- 
required payment for taxes does not apply to 
government-required payments for not providing 
adequate health insurance to your workers.
Religion and Women’s Health
Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent for herself 
and Justices Stephen Breyer, Kagan, and Soto-
mayor. The gender lineup is instructive: all three 
female justices supported the lawfulness of the 
contraceptive mandate, whereas five of the six 
male justices did not. Justice Ginsburg began 
her dissent by noting that the majority opinion 
was “of startling breadth,” holding as it did that 
“commercial enterprises . . . can opt out of any 
law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible 
with their sincerely held religious beliefs . . . 
[without regard to the] disadvantages that reli-
gion-based opt-outs impose on others.”2
Echoing the majority’s view that the ability to 
form a corporation gives a person the ability to 
participate in the economic “life of the Nation,” 
she quoted a prior decision in which the Court 
acknowledged that “the ability of women to par-
ticipate equally in the economic and social life 
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability 
to control their reproductive lives.” Gender 
equality in health care is what the contraceptive 
regulation sought to promote by putting “health 
care decisions — including the choice among 
contraceptive methods — in the hands of women, 
with the aid of their health care providers.”2
Justice Ginsburg was not persuaded that 
RFRA even applies to for-profit corporations, 
making the point that prior to this opinion, the 
Court had never recognized that a for-profit cor-
poration could qualify for a religious objection 
to a generally applicable law. In her view, non-
profit religious corporations can be distinguished 
from for-profit corporations because the former 
exist not to make money, but to serve “a com-
munity made up of believers in the same reli-
gion.” As persuasive as her argument is about 
for-profit corporations, it should be noted that it 
was explicitly shared by only one other justice, 
with two justices deciding not to give their 
opinion. She also argued that although the ma-
jority sought to confine its opinion to “closely 
held corporations, its logic extends to corpora-
tions of any size, public or private.”2
Likewise, Justice Ginsburg noted that al-
though the Court tried to confine its reasoning 
to 4 of the 20 FDA-approved contraceptives, “the 
Court’s reasoning appears to permit commercial 
enterprises . . . to exclude from their group 
health plans all forms of contraceptives.” This is 
a substantial burden on women, especially those 
earning low wages. As Ginsburg noted, but the 
majority ignored, an IUD generally costs more 
than $1,000 when the office visit and insertion 
procedure are added, an expenditure that is 
“nearly equivalent to a month’s full-time pay for 
workers earning the minimum wage.” Nor are 
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contraceptives all that the opinion addressed. 
Its logic could apply, Justice Ginsburg suggest-
ed, to employers with religious objections “to 
blood transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); anti-
depressants (Scientologists); medications derived 
from pigs . . . (certain Muslims, Jews, and Hin-
dus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, 
among others).”2
Justice Ginsburg also got the best of a core 
question: Is the “burden” on the religious be-
liefs of a corporation’s owners “substantial” if a 
female employee uses one of the four religiously 
objectionable contraceptives? Ginsburg argued 
that there are too many breaks in the link be-
tween the corporation owners and the possible 
results of the use of contraception by an em-
ployee, including actions by the employee, her 
physician, and perhaps the pharmacist, to sub-
stantially burden the company’s religious beliefs. 
For example, it is unlikely that the corporation’s 
owners would feel morally responsible if an em-
ployee died in childbirth as a result of an unin-
tended pregnancy. Nor was it likely that this 
group of owners would feel morally responsible 
for any pregnancy-related conditions or deaths 
that could have been prevented by use of the four 
religiously objectionable birth-control methods. 
And why is it a violation of one’s religion to pro-
vide health insurance (which everyone concedes 
is part of employee compensation) that covers 
all 20 contraceptives but not a violation of reli-
gion for employees to use their wages to pur-
chase the four contraceptives to which the com-
pany has a religious objection?
In the context of making money, rather than 
spending it, Hobby Lobby itself apparently has 
no religious objection to an intervening agent 
making choices that funnel its money to the 
makers of contraceptives, including Plan B. Hob-
by Lobby’s public filings regarding the 401(k) 
retirement plan it funds and operates for its em-
ployees reveal that a portion of this plan is in-
vested, by fund managers such as Vanguard, in 
companies like Teva Pharmaceuticals, the maker 
of Plan B.17
Medic al C are and the AC A
In terms of health care, the reaction of the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists (ACOG) to the Court’s opinion seems just 
about right to us: “This decision inappropriately 
allows employers to interfere in women’s health 
care decisions . . . [which] should be made by 
a woman and her doctor, based on the patient’s 
needs and her current health.” ACOG went on to 
underline that contraceptives and family plan-
ning are mainstream medical care and should 
be treated as such. In their words, “access to con-
traception is essential women’s health care.”18
The Court’s ruling can also be viewed as a 
direct consequence of our fragmented health 
care system, in which fundamental duties are 
incrementally delegated and imposed on a range 
of public and private actors. The Court is correct 
on one dimension of its opinion: if universal ac-
cess to contraceptives is a compelling societal 
interest, then the provision of such access ought 
to fall first and foremost on the national govern-
ment and only secondarily be transferred to pri-
vate parties.19 Our systemic reliance on health 
insurance that is based on private employment 
provokes just this sort of clash between public 
and private values.20
Our incremental, fragmented, and incomplete 
health insurance system means that different 
Americans have different access to health care 
on the basis of their income, employment status, 
age, and sex. The decision in Hobby Lobby unrav-
els only one more thread, perhaps, but it tugs 
on a quilt that is already inequitable and un-
even.21 A central goal of the ACA was to repair 
some of this incremental fragmentation by uni-
versalizing certain basic health care entitle-
ments. In ruling in favor of idiosyncratic reli-
gious claims over such universality, the Court 
has once again expressed its disagreement with 
this foundational health-policy goal.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with 
the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
From the Department of Health Law, Bioethics, and Human 
Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston 
(G.J.A.); and the University of Pennsylvania School of Law 
(T.W.R.) and Perelman School of Medicine and the Leonard Da-
vis Institute of Health Economics (J.P.R.) — all in Philadelphia.
This article was published on July 16, 2014, at NEJM.org.
1. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
132S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Special-
ties Corporation, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505 (June 30).
3. Mariner WK, Glantz LH, Annas GJ. Reframing federalism 
— the Affordable Care Act (and broccoli) in the Supreme Court. 
N Engl J Med 2012;367:1154-8.
4. Recommendations. In: Committee on Preventive Services for 
Women, Institute of Medicine. Clinical prevention services for 
An interview with 
Professor Annas 
is available at 
NEJM.org 
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org on October 16, 2014. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2014 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
n engl j med 371;9 nejm.org august 28, 2014866
Health Law, Ethics, and Human Rights
women: closing the gap. Washington, DC: National Academies 
Press, 2011:102-10.
5. The court limits Americans’ rights. New York Times. July 1, 
2014:A16.
6. Religious liberty affirmed. Wall Street Journal. June 30, 2014: 
A12.
7. Annas GJ. Abortion politics and health insurance reform. 
N Engl J Med 2009;361:2589-91.
8. Birth control: medicines to help you. Silver Spring, MD: Food 
and Drug Administration (http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/
ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/ucm313215.htm).
9. Hobby Lobby Stores v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (CA 10 2013).
10. Mariner WK. Hobby Lobby — Part 2: do religions get their 




11. U.S. Code, Title 42: The Public Health and Welfare, 
Sec.300gg-13, coverage of preventive health services.
12. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725-26.
13. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Profes-
sors in Support of Petitioners, 3-5 (Nos. 13-354 and 13-356).
14. Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, 134 S.Ct. 1022 (2014).
15. Wheaton College v. Burwell, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4706 (July 3).
16. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
17. Long H. Hobby Lobby does invest in birth control. CNN 
Money. July 2, 2014 (http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/01/investing/
hobby-lobby-401k-contraception).
18. ACOG statement on the Supreme Court decision on Hobby 
Lobby v. Burwell. Washington, DC: American Congress of Ob-




19. Ruger JP. Health and social justice. Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press, 2009.
20. Cohen IG, Lynch HF, Curfman GD. When religious freedom 
clashes with access to care. N Engl J Med 2014;371:596-9.
21. Ruger JP. Fair enough? Inviting inequities in state health 
benefits. N Engl J Med 2012;366:681-3.
DOI: 10.1056/NEJMhle1408081
Copyright © 2014 Massachusetts Medical Society.
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org on October 16, 2014. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2014 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
